requirements can take advantage from the specification of an appropriate notion of dynamic competition. But a preliminary definition is indispensable for a better understanding of the analysis that will follow.
This essay expresses the dimensions of disequilibria (accompanying the development process), and the existing set of opportunities for profit, through the differences among the profit rates of firms, as measured by the variance of profit rates across firms. It also considers that this measure offers an important proxy of the degree of uncertainty of economic life, both because the residual nature of profits fully expresses the ultimate impact of stochastic elements affecting the economic process, and because the differences among the profit rates of firms gives a faithful picture of the incompleteness of knowledge; in fact, a zero difference (variance) of profit rates across firms would require a perfect knowledge, with omniscience of the entrepreneur.
Economic competition is driven by the search for profit that takes two forms: first, the creation of new opportunities for profit through innovation, which can be called innovative entre preneu rship and comp etition o r, following Schumpeter (1954) , creative destr uction. (Schumpeter says : "This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other (based on prices) as a bombardment is in comparison with forcing a door"); second, the systematic exploitation of existing opportunities for profit (synthetized by the variance of profit rate) due to market disequilibria, which can be called adaptive entrepreneurship and competition -it is well expressed by the Kirzner's notions of market process and entrepreneurial alertness.
Innovative entre preneu rship causes disequilibria, obsolescence, the amplification of the variance of profit rates, and uncertainty, while adaptive entrepreneurship is the leading force of the adjustment processes towards new equilibria, thus implying the reduction of disequilibria and uncer tainty. Innovative entrepreneurship is embodied by innovative investment, while adaptive entrepreneurship is expressed by the incessant revision of productive choices stimulated by the variability of profit rates and expectations.
The notion of dynamic competition that this essay sets out results from the combination of the two above forms of competition. There exist some important interactions between them, that may be described as follows.
In the presence of high disequilibria and a large variance of profit rates across firms and uncertainty, adaptive entrepreneurship (i.e. the revision of productive choices directed to take profit of the existing disequilibria or, more precisely, pushed by the variance of profit rate) prevails, at the expense of innovative entre preneu rship. This is also compressed by the fact that investment, mainly innovative, involving long run expectations, sunk costs and irreversibilities, is discouraged by high uncertainty that reduces the reliability of information and increases its cost (furthermore innovations have to meet initially various unexp ected drawbacks, that imply lower retu r n, high uncertainty and a large use of entrepreneurial skills). But the predominance of adaptive entrepreneurship resulting in the reduction of disequilibria and the variance of profit rate, sque e z es out profit opp o rtunities; so that such a predominance erodes its own basis. To overcome the depressive impact of this squeeze on profit rate, entrepreneurs will be encouraged to intensify innovation, which again amplifies the variance of profit rate, hence the set of existing opportunities for profit. Such a shift towards innovative competition is also stimulated by the fact that the decrease in uncertainty due to the equilibrating nature of adaptive competition favours and encourages substitution of plants, previously postponed, and hence innovation. But the diffusion of innovations causes a rise in obsolescence, disequilibria, the variance of profit rate and uncertainty, thus recreating the basis of adaptive competition, and the fall of the profits achieved by the pioneers; this opens the door to the recovery of adaptive entrepreneurship, while innovative projects are put in the drawer, waiting for some clearer perspectives and a further recovery of innovative competition. In sum, disequilibria and uncertainty intensify adaptation (i.e. the revision of productive choices aimed at taking advantage of the existing opportunities for profit due to disequilibria), and depress innovation; this pushes the economy to adjust towards equilibrium (thus squeezing adaptive opportunities for profit) that, in turn, stimulates innovation both to recreate profit opportunities and owing to the improvement of long r un expectations due to the decrease in uncertainty; and so on, with a cyclical interaction of the above two forms of competition.
This innovation-adaptation process is at the heart of the mechanism of economic growth and development and represents a specification, for the economy, of the more general succession "innovation-structural organization" giving the basic engine of social development. Instead, it is almost irrelevant for the explanation of the development process to investigate the extremely various ways inventions take place, as these produce effects on the economy through innovation. If a competitive mechanism stimulating innovative investment operates, the knowledge and inventions required to feed it will certainly be produced, in one way or the other. A subtle deepening of this matter is in Scott (1992) . A complete formalization of the process innovation-adaptation would require a micro analysis. A first step of that formalization, useful for macro analysis, may consist in the explanation of innovation and uncertainty-variance of profit rate through a Lotka-Volterra predator-prey system (with uncertainty acting as the predator and innovation as the prey) that describes the cyclical interaction between these two variables:
(2) I I = innovative investment u = variance of profit rate across firms, which also is a proxy of uncertainty per unit of output ξ = exogenous factor of uncertainty
Of course, the variance of profit rate can be explained only at micro level. Nevertheless, the simple explanation given by equation (2) seems to be helpful for macro-economic investigation.
The parameter β 1 is a constant exponential rate of growth of innovation, expressing the autonomous push to innovate due to entre preneu rial aggressiveness; its impact on DI is reduced by the rise in the variance of profit rate across firms and uncertainty. β 3 is an exponential rate of variation of the variance of profit rate and uncertainty; its negative sign expresses the compressing effect on u arising from adaptive competition.
The above formalization implies a prominence of equations (1) and (2) on the remaining relations of the model. These are influenced by the Volterra system but do not influence it. A more detailed representation of reality would remove such a prominence and establish a bidirectional linkage.
It may be assumed that the "reproduction" hypothesis, typical of Volterra's study on populations, operates only in the equation of innovation in that each innovation is strongly influenced by the state of knowledge due to previous innovations. In the equation of the variance of profit rates, however, it may operate only backwards as uncertainty stimulates adaptation. This means that in (2) the cross-product term of Volterra, the encounter between predator and prey, will be replaced by the prey (innovation) only.
The parameter of the above differential system gives an important picture of dynamic competition and the economic development process characterizing various countries and different sectors of the same country (as well as an explanation of the difference in the rate of growth among countries).
Various studies have measured the degree of dynamic competition in the economy (Mueller, 1990; Odagiri, 1994) by the rapidity of reduction in the differential (hence variance) of profit rates. Such a procedure only considers the adaptive aspect of dynamic competition, so substantially it limits itself to the term β 3 of equation (2). This is a poor draft of the forces of competition and economic dynamism. The dynamic comp etition process consists in a disequalibrating-equilibrating movement. To understand its meaning, intensity and implications it is necessary to consider all the parameters of equations (1) and (2), taking present that parameters β 1 and β 2 express respectively the innovative push and its brake , and p arameters β 3 and β 4 synthetiz e respectively the adaptive push and its brake. Thus β 1 and β 4 represent the disequilibrating forces while β 3 and β 2 synthetize the equilibrating forces.
To complete the formalization of the process of dynamic competition, we need a theory of entrepreneurial decisions to produce consistent with such a process, which permits specification of an explanatory function of output. The two basic assumptions of the mainstream theory of firm, i.e. the hypothesis that entrepreneurs know technology perfectly (the constraint of the optimum problem in such a theory) and the notion of perfect competition based on prices, are at all inconsistent with dynamic competition, hence unable to represent reality. In the modern economies dominated by innovative competition and uncertainty, technical coefficients are known only after the accomplishment of the productive process. This study substitutes to the mainstream theory of the firm based on the maximization of profit under the constraint of the available technology and productive resources, a theory of the entrepreneurial choice postulating the maximization of a function expressing the "attractiveness" of i , i r i each productive choice, under the constraint of the available entrepreneurial skill. More precisely, the hypothesis is that the entrepreneur distributes his skills among the sectors lying in the area of his interests and choice, with the purpose of maximizing the total benefit which can be derived from productive skills. This approach is suggested, among other things, both by the elementary consideration (first pointed out by Schumpeter) that the only scarce resource for an entrepreneur is his skill as all other resources can easily be provided at the market prices by a successful businessman, and by the fact that the entrepreneur's knowledge of his skill (the constraint of our maximum problem) is much better than that of the variable technologies. Of course, entrepreneurial skills have a different content with reference to an individual or a managerial firm; they are largely represented by the decisional routines typical of each firm.
The maximum problem for each entrepreneur may be formulated as follows:
X = level of output; u = degree of uncertainty; g = entrepreneurial skills required per unit of output, in the presence of a given degree of uncertainty (say u = 1); E p = available entrepreneurial skill (entrepreneur engaged in some activities should not refer the first constraint to E p but reallocated entrepreneurial skill resulting from the difference between his total available skill and that absorbed by the level of profitable activities in which he operates); M = minimum expected advantage required to operate in sector i. r° is a measure of "attractiveness", for each entrepreneur, of the various activities. It may be represented as a function of the actual observed profit rate (r), uncertainty (u) and the excess demand (X d /X) influencing expectations and τ (the non-monetary benefits connected to the entrepreneurial role), i.e.:
r°= f(r, u, X d /X, τ ) with ϑr°/ϑu<0. r is a sectoral profit rate and X (in the term X d /X) refers to sectoral output, not to output of each entrepreneur that would imply circularity in the optimization problem. (More precisely, the function r° should put r , indicating the highest profit rate that entrepreneur knows, in the place of r . For its part, , should be explained through an equation expressing the search for profit, which is obviously promoted by the variance of profit rate. Of course, these developments would imply a micro sp ecification of the theory) The constraints of the maximization problem are either linear, with g and u being given for the entrepreneur, or convex, as the scale of production may at first fall and later increase the skills required per unit of output; while the objective function is concave owing to the increasing effect of output on profitability due to economies of scale, and the decre asing one due to organizational limits and increasing risk. (Thus the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a global maximum.) The above problem expresses the entrepreneurs' tireless revision of choices, directed to exploit the best existing market opportunities. The entrepreneur is obliged to search for the best profit opportunities by uncertainty, i.e. by the fear that otherwise he might make losses in the competition with maximizing entre preneu rs, and be fo rced out of business. Of cou rse , the theo retical foundation of the above optimization approach does not require that entrepreneurs effectively solve maximization problems, but only that such an approach well represents the basic behaviour of entrepreneurs.The central position it attributes to skills and uncertainty is consistent with bounded rationality in a world characterized by imperfect information so that learning processes and any associated non-linearities (Day and Chen, 1993) , as well as with Nelson's and Winter's (1982) teaching on decisional routines which represent an important expression of entrepreneurial skills. Moreover,the hypothesized entrepreneur's behaviour is consistent with a large variety of firm organization and decisional routines, which determine the degree of success of e ach fir m. The maximum problem has a unique solution, implying the functional relationship
At the macro level g and M disappear but not r° (the aggregate attractiveness on entrepreneurs to produce) as its value influences output, both through entry and exit (hence E p ) and because of the inequality constraint on E p and M. The substitution of r° with its explanatory variables (i.e. r, X d /X, u, τ ) gives the following aggregate function for output:
X d /X = excess demand; r = actual observable profit rate. If u = 0, implying a perfectly repetitive economy, no entrepreneurship is required, as such an economy can be directed efficiently by a bureaucratic management and by computers. Of course, the operator f in the above function is influenced largely by the lack of entrepreneurial knowledge; as a matter of fact, if a productive opportunity is unknown, it will be non-influential on the entrepreneur's decision and output.
In the presence of market power, the above supply function is characterized by smooth variations of r, due to the relative invariance of the markup margin. But the parameter of X d /X is, in the case of an oligopolistic market, higher than in a market regulated by demand and supply, since the defence of the price imputed ne eds that price makers promptly adjust supply to demand, by varying the degree of capacity utilization.
Solving the expression of X for r, gives: r
is a desired or partial equilibrium profit rate, required to produce X unit of output for given values of u, E p , X d /X, τ .
An expression for the growth of income could be derived by optimization of an intertemporal objective function. In this paper, however, the equation of r * is used to provide an expression for the rate of growth of income: (4) explains the variation of output through the adjustment of actual profit rate towards the desired profit rate. If r > r * , i.e. the actual profit rate exceeds the profit rate required to produce the current level of output, output grows, while it decreases if r < r * . If r = r * , the rate of growth is nil (stationary equilibrium) as the entrepreneur obtains just the profit rate required to produce the current level of output.
Parameter α in (4) indicates the entre preneu rial alertness in taking advantage of the market opportunities; the lower the entrepreneurs' degree of knowledge of such opportunities, the lower is α . It may be important to point out that the above equation of output embodies all factors influencing the decision to produce, precisely both the conditions of profitability expressed by r (including the effect of income distribution, demand, technology, prices), and those of entrepreneurship, expressed by the variables on which r * depends. This prevents the one sidedness characterizing other theories of growth.
Equations (1), (2) and (4) give the representation of the whole process of dynamic competition and the basic engine of growth.
The explanation of repetitive investment may be derived by substituting capital to output in (4). But there is an important difference with respect to production. We have previously seen that decisions to invest, involving long run expectations, are much more influenced by uncertainty than those to produce, owing to sunk costs, irreversibilities and rapid growth, with uncertainty, of the costs of information necessary to support long run forecasting. This suggests that the equation of the variation of capital should be of the following form:
K stands for the stock of capital, while a 1 u indicates the above additional impact of uncertainty on investment. Substituting equation (4) into equation (5), gets:
(5') As we can see, in the presence of innovation and uncertainty, the variation of capital tends, on the one hand, to exce ed the variation of X owing to the innovative push, but on the other hand is slowed by uncertainty. This means that when uncertainty is low, the capital-output ratio tends to increase, while it tends to decrease in the opposite situation. The constancy of the capital-output in the long r un is probably the result of the cyclical interaction betwe en innovative and adaptive entrepreneurship and competition.
It is cr ucial for an explanation of economic g rowth and development to combine the analyses of Schumpeter and Kirzner on entrepreneurship and competition. Their separate use is misleading. Schumpeter's theory neglects the importance of uncertainty and, more generally, of the adaptive process; but, if comp etition were only based on cre ative destr uction, it would cause an excessive destr uction, i.e. obsolescence. Imitation (of innovators) does not promote, per se, the return to the circular flow; on the contrary, it increases the impact of innovation on the economy, hence obsolescence, disr uption and disequilibria, notwithstanding it favours the return to routine in the specific sector. Therefore, it explains the cycle of products, but is unable to explain that of the whole economy. For its part, the Kirzner's analysis centred on market adjustment process as a result of the entrepreneurs' alertness does not take care of explaining economic development, "seen merely as a special case" (Kirzner, 1973, p. 81) . But the Kirznerian equilibrating process is incomplete without the disequilibrating one, which is Schumpeterian, that creates the basis for market adjustment process.
A succinct exposition of the remaining equations of the model is given below. Labour demand is explained by the inverse of a production function, as follows:
L is employment and e indicates exponential. The above production function includes, among other things: technical progress, expressed by innovative investment (I I ); the variation of uncertainty, that influences the efficient combination of productive factors. The last two factors reflect the cyclical behaviour of innovation and uncertainty; their opposite effect does not cancel out as the variation of u oscillates around a value tendentially constant of this variable, while is I I > 0. Of course, equation (6) gives by implication labour productivity, output being explained by equation (4). Note that here the production function does not explain output directly, as the models of endogenous growth do; it influences output indirectly, through the presence of L in the profit identity below. Output depends on productive decisions of the entrepreneur and the mechanism of dynamic competition.
The relevance that this model ascribes to the distinction between actual and p ar tial equilibrium profit rate makes it necessary to give an accu rate description also of the first. It may be expressed by the following identity:
Where w/p is the real wage, i is the real interest rate and tax stays for the coefficient of taxation on capital. r is the profit rate, taken in real terms. Note that the profit rate differs from the real interest rate which is simply considered an exogenous cost, but it could easily be made endogenous. The return on capital is r + i; it is equal to i only in the exceptional case that r = 0. Price can be expressed by the adjustment of demand and supply, i.e.
or, in the presence of market power, by:
where π stands for the deg re e of monopoly and could be indicated as an increasing function of the variation rate of innovative investment (DI I /DI I ); ϑ is a symbol of partial derivative. Various hypotheses will be formulated on income distribution, in connection with some assumptions on the form of markets and the evolution of economy towards successive phases of development, discussed later.
Real consumption (C ) is expressed as: C = cX (9) c is an average propensity to consume.
Aggregate demand is specified through the identity:
where Z is the exogenous factor of demand.
Finally, an explanatory equation for the availability of entrepreneurial skills is postulated:
This equation supposes that, at the macro level, the availability of entrepreneurial skills (E p ) grows with aggregate output, as a result of the entry of new entre preneu rs as the market exp ands. 0 < η < 1 (i.e. E p g rows at a decreasing rate) owing to: first, the physical and organizational limits to the skills of firms, mainly the reduction, with the concentration process, of adaptive skills (this limitation gives a main explanation of the limit to the size of firm); and second, the entry of less skilful entrepreneurs when X grows, previously kept outside the market.
The interaction innovation-adaptation and evolution. Business cycle versus social development cycle
In this model, growth is driven by dynamic competition that generates innovation and reduces, through adaptive action, the consequent disequilibria and uncertainty. Innovation stimulates growth owing to its impact on the actual profit rate (r) via the production function (i.e. labou r productivity) and investment hence demand, while adaptation stimulates g rowth through the reduction in uncertainty, hence in r * and the increase in labour productivity. The core equations of the model are those for innovation (1), uncertainty (2), and output (4). Important roles are also played by the equation for the stock of capital (5) and the production function (6), as well as equation (11) for the availability of entrepreneurial skill, owing to the impact of this variable on r * , and hence on the rate of growth of income.
Equations (1) and (2) of innovation and uncertainty display a dominant role in the model, as they influence the rest of the system without any feedback. This aspect of the model is unrealistic, but this can easily be remedied through the introduction in the two equations of some other explanatory variable.
The aggregate nature of the model impedes the role of sectoral disequilibria in generating actual profit rate (r) and the partial equilibrium profit rate (r * ). In the absence of innovation and the resulting disequilibria and uncertainty, r and r * disapp e ar and the stationary state dominates the scene. In re ality, disequilibrium prevails (a disaggregated model would show this clearly) as a consequence of the entrepreneurial innovative competition, with positive or negative rates of growth according to the conditions of profitability (influencing r) and those of entrepreneurship (influencing r * ) making r > r * or vice versa (in an economy without entrepreneurs, growth could only be pushed by some autonomous decision to invest, car ried out by the p olitical sphere o r bureaucracy. But bureaucratic behaviour tends to avoid innovations that undermine the established roles, thus preventing development). For its part, accumulation fluctuates around the rate of growth of income, owing to the higher impact that uncertainty plays on investment than on output. As a consequence, the output-capital ratio fluctuates around a tendentially constant value.
At the heart of economic dynamics there is the entrepreneurial action or, mo re precisely, the interaction betwe en innovative and adaptive entrepreneurship and competition that, as just seen, pushes endogenous growth. Such growth has a cyclical behaviour, due to the alternation, over time, of a phase of innovative push, characterized by the rise in innovation, and a phase of structural organization, devoted to establishing some new equilibria starting from the previous innovations and distinguished by a squeeze of innovation and the prevalence of adaptation. If these two phases (innovation and structural organization) were not reciprocally lagged or were separated by very short lags, the cycle would disappear or would be very smooth. But this is not the case. The innovative dash requires a well ordered system, i.e. coasting some equilibrium positions. As soon as this happens, innovation projects are introduced; their diffusion induces further innovations along with increasing disequilibria, that stimulate the need for str uctural reorganization and adaptation. The cycle innovation-uncer tainty affects output both directly and owing to labou r productivity, investment and demand.
The interaction innovation-adaptation may explain cycles of different periods simply by considering various kinds of innovations. When the large set of innovative possibilities due to basic innovations has been exploited, along intermediate cycles innovation-adaptation, new technological paradigms and new basic innovations (even in institutions), implying long waves, will take place, that will allow the continuation of the dynamic competition process. These cycles of innovations are strengthened by the cyclical behaviour of inventions underlined by Kuhn (alternation in the development of ordinary and extraordinary knowledge).
The mechanism described here seems to provide also a useful tool for the interpretation of social and historical development. This may be represented through the alternation of a breaking phase, characterized by the prevalence of fundamental discoveries, and an adjustment phase aimed at developing, exploiting and systematizing the implications of the main discoveries. This shows some similarities to the Kuhn theory of the str ucture of scientific revolutions. But Kuhn describes the evolution of sciences as due to the exhaustion of paradigm, marked by the appearance of "anomalies". This is not convincing. In a stationary system, the paradigm perseveres immortally, anomalies do not appear. It is the propensity to innovate that gives the basic push to development, thus breaking up conventional knowledge and the strength of tradition. Such a propensity depends on the form of civilization (degree of openness to the novelties or the existence of some mechanism forcing innovation, as the search for profit based on innovative competition). It is not the wasting of paradigms that opens the road to innovation, rather the contrary happens.
The cycle discussed here expresses the simple evidence that innovative push is the true engine of the movement of societies (its absence would have left mankind in the stone age). But even adaptation plays a central role, as it provides the diffusion over the whole system of such a push and the consistency among the various comp onents of the system. The interaction betwe en innovation and structural organization may be seen as a basic law of social evolution, with a role similar to that played by the Darwinian succession "accidental mutation-selection" for the natural world evolution. In the present age, distinguished by the centrality of the economic subsystem, the above engine of development is mainly activated by entrepreneurial competition. But some other subsystem and evolutionary mechanism may prevail in the future.
The discrete extraordinary events represented by innovations, with their impact on environment expressed by the continuous adaptive process, produce irrevocable changes. The direction of evolution, marked by the increasing variety of goods and knowledge, hence the increase in social complexity, gives the histo rical time. Such an evolutionary process does not app ear at the agg regate level, where only the g rowth in productivity due to technical progress is visible. Its representation needs disaggregation.
Econometric estimation
The lack of observations has prevented a simultaneous estimation of the complete model. This has been divided in two submodels for estimation: one concer ning Volter ra's system fo r innovation and uncertainty; the other represented by the equations of output (and desired profit rate), employment and actual profit rate.
In the absence of data series on innovative investment, the estimate of innovation uses the data on patent applications (giving a reliable expression of the intention to innovate) published by the US Department of Commerce, while the data on the interquartile variation of profit rates (instead of the variance of profit rates) come from a sample of about 8,000 manufacturing firms, performed for the period 1982-1992 by the Italian Centrale dei Bilanci. The estimation results must be judged in the light of the deficiencies of appropriate data series and the shortness of the observation interval.
A full information maximum likelihood estimator was used to preserve the interactions among equations. innovation and the variance of profit rates (equations (1) and (2), with the term I I in the right hand side of equation (2) instead of I I u, has given the following results shown in Tables I and II. It is considered that the shortness of the sample (only 12 observations) and the use of interquartile variation of profit rates (instead of variance) are the reasons why the asymptotic standard errors are relatively high. However, the values of the parameters are reasonable and always have the correct sign and also the estimated standard deviations are reasonable. Now we come to a simultaneous FIML estimation of the following model:
Where VA indicates real value added in industry; L stays for employment in industry and w for wage rate; r is the actual profit rate in industry; and r * the desired profit rate; PROD stays for industrial productivity of labour; P is the deflator of industrial value added; K is the stock of capital in industry and KP its expression in nominal terms; i is a nominal interest rate and KU the degree of utilization of plants. Log stays for natural logarithms. The implications of the model for subsequent phases of economic development. Some simulation experiments This section, devoted to the model's capability to interpret various historical situations, is an indicator of its degree of generality. It also accounts for the succession of some stages of economic development simply by making some suitable alternative assumptions on the availability of entrepreneurial skills, technology, income distribution, the market forms and, more broadly, the performance of dynamic competition, i.e. the basic engine of evolution. It may be convenient to postulate an initial phase of development. This will probably be distinguished by: weak entrepreneurial skills and aggressiveness (especially in the presence of a civilization hostile to entrepreneurs and market institution) hence a substantial absence of dynamic comp etition; low productivity, i.e. high labour coefficient; real wages close to the subsistence level, hence incompressible downward. Such an economy produces a low surplus, which is largely paid to the owners of scarce resources. In consequence and according to equation (7), the profit rate r is low and decreasing. Besides, the lack in entrepreneurial skill will stimulate the desired profit rate (r * ). Therefore the rate of growth of output will decrease towards zero, according to equation (4). This is the only equilibrium possible, as the stagnation stops the increase in the rent, hence the decrease in profit, and the increase in r * . This situation is illustrated partly by the model in formulation of a simplified version in the Appendix, showing that the term X η-1 with 0 < η < 1 (that postulates a decreasing availability of entrepreneurial skills per unit of output) implies the existence of a stable stationary equilibrium. This "trap of underdevelopment" expresses a situation similar to that described by the Ricardian theory of g rowth and stagnation, cor related to the absence of the evolutive push conferred by dynamic competition.
If the economy succeeds in avoiding the trap, it can start the development of a dynamic sector. To do that, it requires a primary accumulation in the form of infrastr uctu re , education, investment in the new secto r, and to promote entrepreneurship, necessary to invest the available resources and increase productivity through dynamic competition. In this regard, it may be important to influence the ethic system, so as to increase τ (non-monetary benefit attached to the entrepreneurial function), that may compensate the disincentive to produce due to low profit rate. In particular, an entrepreneurial Stakhanovism may be promoted, as well as state entrepreneurship (which is not necessarily influenced by profit rate but only requires the consideration of relative profit rates of firms to evaluate the convenience to finance them). In this way, the absorption of the resources for accumulation is warranted. Another possibility is to build a command economy, i.e. without entrepreneurs. This short cut can initially be successful but, in the long run, it pushes the economy into a blind road, as is well known. This model, with a dynamic sector expressing a strong dynamic competition, may produce two different evolutions.
First, prices and wages are governed by demand and supply. In this case, if there does not exist a lack of entrepreneurship, i.e. if this grows linearly with production (as assumed in formulations for markets regulated by demand and supply and oligopolistic markets in the Appendix), a Lewisian process of growth can take place. The excess of labour present in the backward sector squeezes wages in the dynamic sector towards the subsistence level. (More precisely, a low differential of wages with the backward sector is enough to convey towards the dynamic sector the labour force it needs.) This, together with a sectoral productivity much higher than that of the backward sector, implies a high profit rate, that promotes a high accumulation rate. A cyclical expansion (due to the interaction between innovation and uncertainty) of the dynamic sector around an increasing trend leads to a gradual absorption of the excess labour in the backward sector, ending with its disappearance.
Second, the growth in the size of firms and the bargaining power of trade unions creates an oligopolistic market for goods and labour. In this case real wages in the dynamic sector go beyond the subsistence level, under the influence of the increase in labour productivity. This behaviour is promoted both by the demands by trade unions for productivity increases distribution and the interest of firms to wage increases that warrant the constancy of unit labour cost hence, for a given margin of mark up, the downward rigidity of oligopolistic prices, as well as an increasing demand of sectoral production. Profits are now much lower than in the first case; consequently, the sectoral rate of growth slows down. Furthermore, the increasing wage differential between the two sectors provokes an explosive exodus from the backward sector, that exceeds the labour force needs of the advanced sector. This stimulates the birth of a refuge sector and an increasing inflationary potential, due to social tensions and bottlenecks in the immigration areas and the proliferation of assisted areas. As long as firms have the control of income distribution through market power, these inefficiencies and costs are charged (via inflation) on labou r that negotiates money wages, without affecting profit rate. But the rate of growth is now lower than in the first case, therefore the disappearance of the backward sector requires much more time than in the first case.
Over time, real wages may cease to be a residue, through their indexation or in the presence of a fixed exchange rate. As a consequence, the costs and inefficiencies accompanying the excess exodus squeeze profits and cause a cyclical involution towards stagnation (trap of dualism). (An estimation for Italy of this phenomenon is in Fusari, 1986.) In this situation the strength of dynamic competition in the advanced sector may imply, together with the deepening of dualism, the strengthening of the trap. This may be formalized by postulating a modified system of Lotka-Volterra equations, expressing the interaction between the rate of growth of labour productivity in the dynamic secto r, as the prey that fe eds (through an incre asing difference in the intersectoral standards of life) the excess exodus, and the latter as the predator, that squeezes the exponential rate of growth of productivity in the dynamic sector (presumably pushed by an autonomous catching up mechanism). Note that, differently from the basic Volterra model, where uncertainty fluctuates around some values tendentially invariant in the long run, i.e. towards a limit cycle, here the excess exodus tends to cumulate. More precisely, the Volterra system has to be expressed now in a degenerate form, i.e. without the negative constant in the equation of the excess exodus (predator). This causes an uninterrupted growth of the predator and probably the disappearance of the prey, i.e. the involution of the cycle towards a zero growth equilibrium.
Another way to express this involutive process is to specify, in the basic model: one equation for the excess exodus; one representing the inflationary effect of this exodus; one equation for re al wages in the dynamic secto r depending on the sectoral increase in labour productivity; the impossibility for this sector (due to international competition) to charge the costs caused by the excess exodus to domestic inflation. So, the rate of profit in the dynamic sector is squeezed, hence the accumulation process.
To prevent this, income policies, the control of migration and of disequilibria able to avoid excess exodus are required. We can se e, therefore, that the promotion of the take-off needs instr uments that markedly differ with the lateness of the development process, as pointed out by the famous storiographic research of Gerschenkron (1962) .
This kind of involution is very frequent today, especially in Latin America, South East Asia, and the Middle East; it is mainly expressed by the abnormal growth of many towns in the third world; it also represents a great menace for Easter n Europe countries in transition towards market institution, mainly Poland with its overcrowded agriculture. Now suppose that both the trap of underdevelopment and dualism are avoided. Two basic situations can arise:
(1) An economy characterized by a well-oiled form of dynamic competition, flexible money wages deter mined by excess demand, re al wages fluctuating with the marginal productivity of labour. Such an economy satisfies the conditions for the achievement of a high and stable rate of growth if dynamic competition manages to avoid, through innovation, bottlenecks in natural resources and to promote a high increase in productivity. (2) An economy distinguished by a diffuse market power, hence money wage rigidity, its share of income distribution determined by the degree of monopoly of firms and therefore with the real wage as a residue. This model has been analysed in the Appendix under the formulation with market power (and abstracting from dynamic competition mechanism), that shows it can yield a stable equilibrium. But the rigidity of money wages precludes full employment. Finally, in a matu re and consumeristic economy, high inflation destroys monetary illusion, hence the assumption of real wages as a residue, that has be en proved in the simplified fo r mulation in the App endix to be a basic condition for the achievement of a long run equilibrium. More precisely, wage bargaining, public sector inefficiencies and expenditure, formal or informal indexation mechanisms strongly influence, in the end, profit rate, hence the path of growth. The control of income distribution is usually restored by high unemployment. This tendency towards stagnation may be overcome through some institutional changes that limit income distribution conflict to the political and social sphere, to restore its irrelevance for firms. We can see, therefore, that history and economic theory go hand in hand even at the aggregate level.
It may be useful to perform some simulation experiment through a model formed by the two groups of equations estimated separately in the previous section. Differently from that estimation, now uncertainty is added in the equation for output, while innovation and the variation of uncertainty are added in the equation for employment.
Four phases of economic development have been considered:
(1) Phase I, representing an initial stage of development, that assumes the following values of the parameters of the Volterra system (1-2): β 1 = 0.262; β 2 = 0.517; β 3 = 0.112; β 4 = 0.663. These values imply a languishing dynamic competition. Besides, the parameter of uncertainty in the equation of output is 0.08 and those of innovation and uncertainty in the equation for employment are respectively 0.1 and 3.8. α 1 has been reduced to 2.14, to express a reduction in entrepreneurial alertness; also the p arameter indicating the impact of the conditions of entrepreneurship on output has been reduced from 0.213 estimated to 0.203. The initial number of patent applications is 300 and the initial interquartile variation of profit rates is 0.65. (2) Phase II presumes that a Lewisian mechanism of development is at work.
The parameters of the system of Volterra are now as follows: β 1 = 0.38; β 2 = 0.49; β 3 = 0.232; β 4 = 0.53, expressing a substantial increase , with respect to phase I, of the parameters β 1 and β 3 concerning innovative and adaptive push, and a remarkable decrease in β 2 and β 4 representing the brake to innovation and adaptation. The initial number of p atent applications is now 350 and the initial interquartile variance of profit rate is 0.75. The parameter of uncertainty in the equation of output is 0.05 and those of innovation and uncertainty in the equation for employment are 0.14 and 2.8. Moreover, an hyp othesis that re al wage remains constant over time is assumed, as in Lewis' mechanism.
(3) Phase III presumes that wages grow less than labour productivity. An impact of the conditions of entrepreneurship on output higher than the previous phases is hypothesized ( 
Conclusion
This essay shows that the explanation of economic growth and development requires an accurate deepening of the crucial phenomena of entrepreneurship, innovation, uncertainty of economic life and their interrelationships. Such a de epening can be centred efficaciously on a particular notion of dynamic comp etition that results from the combination of two main kinds of entrepreneurship and their interaction, the innovative and the adaptive, and made active by the struggle for profit. This competition explains the succession disequilibria-equilibria in the economy and the basic feature of the engine of development and growth. All indications today are that in modern society, with its immense technological p otential, the re al limit to economic development is its endowment of entrepreneurship. This influences decisively both partial equilibrium and actual profit rates, hence the pace of activity, investment and cycle behaviour. An application of the model to successive phases of historical development gives a proof of the generality and flexibility of the theory proposed and of its explanatory power in regard to economic evolution, and shows some different paths of economic development. Further more, the model outlines the importance, in the social life, of the binomial innovation-str uctu ral o rganization, i.e. the disequilibratingequilibrating motion, and shows succinctly that the theory presented can flow into a more general theory of social development. This is a major task for social sciences. It is no accident that the "propensity" for development varies greatly between civilizations and historical eras. The presence and responsibility of innovative entre preneu rship imply, as preconditions, certain premisses concerning values and institutions typical of decentralized economic orders: the market, profit, openness to innovation and change, to the unorthodox and the non-conformist, the critical sense, individualism (not necessarily the acquisitive self-interest), the competitive spirit, and so on. Adam Smith took pains to stress the decisive influence of the size of the market in intensifying the division of labour, and hence in generating the rise in productivity. Actually, though, the imp o rtance of the market for development is antecedent even to this. In particular, it stems from the fact that the market, together with its related ethic values and behaviour patterns, gives the division of labour an evolutionary character, preventing it from becoming the reflection and the seal of more or less rigid social stratification if not the actual division of society into castes. But these topics go beyond the object of this essay.
Appendix. Qualitative analysis of the model
The central mechanism of development and growth that the model in this essay points out, that is the incessant disequilibrating-equilibrating motion resulting from the interaction between innovative and adaptive entre preneu rship, cle arly implies the imp ossibility of a stable equilibrium at the micro level. It also legitimates some serious doubt on the existence of a stable equilibrium at the sectoral level. This appendix investigates the existence of a stable equilibrium solution at the macro level, i.e. the level to which analyses on the stability of equilibrium usually refer. We shall see that to get a macro stable equilibrium it needs to eliminate from the model the Volterra system for innovation and uncertainty (giving an aggregate expression of the dynamic competition process). Such a result indirectly proves the impossibility of a stable equilibrium even at the sectoral level, if the mechanism of dynamic competition is preserved. This implies that the stability properties of some economic model must be considered with great caution, as they always depend on the removal from the model of some crucial part of reality. Now we come to provide some formulation of the model able to get a stable equilibrium solution.
Markets regulated by demand and supply
First we consider a market regulated by the excess demand, also making the hypothesis that real wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labour, that implies the irrelevance for firms of the conflict for income distribution. In order to obtain a stable equilibrium, the original model must be expressed as follows: 
E p in equation (A1) has been expressed as a linear function of X, i.e. E p = γ X, and divided by the scale factor X. Later this expression will be substituted by E p = X η and the implications of this more realistic formulation discussed.
Another important assumption is represented by equation (A10), stating the equality between real wage and marginal productivity of labour (w/p = ϑ X/ϑ L). Such an hypothesis on real wages yields a decisive simplification for the model reduction, as it permits to eliminate equation (A6) and p in identity (A5). Later the assumption expressed by equation (A10) will be released, in relation to the hypothesis of oligopolistic market, and it will be shown that such new formulation does not affect the stability of equilibrium. Equation (A6) has been divided through by K; so it expresses the labour -capital ratio, and equation (A8) has been divided through by X. This facilitates the reduction of the model without modifying its content. The share of the endogenous demand (Z/X) has been considered as exogenous and indicated with z. Equation (A7) implies that price variations cannot be negative or zero; but this equation is irrelevant for the model reduction, as Dp/p does not appear in any other equation while p in identity (A5) is eliminated as above.
A zero order equation for uncertainty (equation A2) has been substituted to the corresponding differential equation in the original model. This implies a substantial dynamic irrelevance of uncertainty, that in fact will be eliminated by substitution. Also the differential equation for innovation has been excluded from the model. The consequent elimination of the Volterra system permits the reduction of the model to one differential equation, that g reatly simplifies the qualitative analysis. This elimination is essential to achieve the stable equilibrium solution discussed below and represents a drastic modification of the original model, as it cancels out the crucial dynamic mechanism of an entrepreneurial economy.
The elimination of the Volterra system, hence of the cycle of uncertainty, implies in the original equation for capital a prior assumption that DK/K ≠ DX/X and therefore that a stable solution requires DX = 0 and DK = 0. To avoid this implication, the equation for capital has been reformulated as in equation (A4).
The reduction of this new model may start from the substitution of equations (A6) where: µ 1 = 1 + α a 1 b 1 and µ 2 = a + b 2 c + b 2 zdb 3 ξ. A 1 < 0 as all terms in the numerator are non-negative, while the denominator is positive; true to tell, the first term in the numerator could be positive, but it is certainly lower than the negative sum of the other two since a 0 ′ (1 + db 1 ) tends to be lower than µ 1 µ 2 , especially if α < 1, as it stands out if we consider the parameters involved and take into account the inequality below, to be satisfied to get a real solution.
A 1 < 0 implies the positivity (i.e. the economic relevance) of at least one solution and, if A 2 < 0, that the solutions are real. But it is very probable that A 2 is positive. This means that, to verify if the solutions are real, it is necessary to analyse the following expression: [ (1 -5 )(1 db 1 )]
Develop the square term in the numerator, collect terms, add and subtract 2α µ 1 µ 2 (1 -β 5 )b 2 , getting:
1 Of course,the non-negativity of the above expression (implying real solutions) depends on [µ 1 b 2 -α a 3 (1 + db 1 )]. This must be non-negative or, if negative, must not exceed in absolute value the square term in the numerator. Take the condition [µ 1 b 2 -α a 3 (1 + db 1 )] ≥ 0, i.e. substituting to µ 1 its expression, b 2 /a 3 ≥ α(1 + db 1 )/(1 + α a 1 b 1 ). d > a 1 , the influence of uncertainty on investment being higher than on production. Therefore, if α = 1, the right hand side term of the above inequality is higher than one; so, a real solution is warranted if the parameter b 2 of demand in the equation of investment exceeds the parameter a 3 of demand in the equation of output at least of the amount (1 + db 1 )/(1 + a 1 b 1 ). Values of α higher than unity reinforce the necessity of such prevalence, while α < 1 tends to reverse it. But real solutions may exist even if [µ 1 b 2 -α a 3 (1 + db 1 )] is negative, provided that the square term in the numerator be at least equal to it. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen, as some factors (α , µ 2 , β 5 ) on which the positivity of the above square term depends also are coefficients (multiplied by four) of the negative value of [µ 1 b 2 -αa 3 (1 + db 1 )].
Being √ A 1 2 -4A 2 lower than the absolute value of A 1 and A 1 < 0, we get the two following positive (real) solutions: X * /K * = (-A 1 + g)/2 and (-A 1 -g)/2, with g =√A 2 -4A 2 .
The substitution of these two equilibrium values in the reduced form equations of output and capital gets the equilibrium rate of growth of these two variables. Now consider if this equilibrium is stable. Take:
To the equilibrium value x * it corresponds:
C 0 x * 2 + C 1 x * + C 2 = 0.
The deviation from the equilibrium may be expressed as:
2 -C 0 x *2 + (2C 0 x * + C 1 )x + C 2 that, after some transformations, becomes:
